Core

Cap includes a stateless server-side library for generating and verifying JWT-based challenges, which is used internally for Standalone.

For most users we recommend Cap Standalone which runs on Docker and is batteries included. We only recommend using the core library directly when you can't run Docker, want to embed challenge generation into an existing service, or need to deploy to an environment without persistent storage (Cloudflare Workers, Lambda, edge functions).

Installation

bun

bun add capjs-core

npm

npm i capjs-core

pnpm

pnpm i capjs-core

Getting started

import { generateChallenge, validateChallenge } from "capjs-core";

// Long, random, high-entropy. Keep this consistent across processes.
const SECRET = process.env.CAP_SECRET;

// 1) Server route: create a challenge
const ch = await generateChallenge(SECRET, {
  scope: "signup", // optional
  instrumentation: true, // optional, see below
});
// → { challenge: { c, s, d }, token, expires, instrumentation? }

// 2) Server route: validate the redeemed challenge
const result = await validateChallenge(
  SECRET,
  {
    token: req.body.token,
    solutions: req.body.solutions,
    instr: req.body.instr,
  },
  {
    scope: "signup",
    consumeNonce: async (sigHex, ttlMs) => myStore.setIfNotExists(`cap:${sigHex}`, 1, ttlMs),
  },
);

if (result.success) {
  // result.token, result.tokenKey, result.expires, result.scope
}

The widget calls generateChallenge to receive { challenge, token, expires, instrumentation }, solves the proof of work client-side, and POSTs { token, solutions, instr } back. You then call validateChallenge to verify.

How it differs from @cap.js/server

Aspect	@cap.js/server	capjs-core
State	In-memory + filesystem token store	Stateless. Challenge tokens are signed JWTs
Constructor	new Cap({ ... })	None — pass secret per call
Replay prevention	Built-in token list with cleanup interval	Opt-in via consumeNonce callback
Cleanup hooks	SIGINT/beforeExit flush	None — TTL is encoded in JWT exp
Filesystem	Required for persistence	Never touched
Worker compatible	No (filesystem)	Yes

Unlike the old library, capjs-core does not validate redeem tokens for you - it returns a tokenKey you store yourself, and a token you give the user. To validate later, re-derive the key from the user's submitted token and look it up:

import { createHash } from "node:crypto";

// Validation route
const [id, verToken] = req.body.token.split(":");
const tokenKey = `${id}:${createHash("sha256").update(verToken).digest("hex")}`;
const expires = await myStore.get(`cap-token:${tokenKey}`);
if (!expires || Number(expires) < Date.now()) {
  return res.status(401).end();
}

API

generateChallenge(secret, opts?)

Returns Promise<{ challenge, token, expires, instrumentation? }>.

• secret — string or Buffer, ≥16 bytes. Master HMAC key, must be consistent across processes.
• opts.challengeCount — number of PoW puzzles. Default 50.
• opts.challengeSize — salt length in hex chars. Default 32.
• opts.challengeDifficulty — target prefix length in hex chars. Default 4.
• opts.expiresMs — challenge TTL. Default 600_000 (10 min).
• opts.scope — optional string bound to the challenge. Validation must pass the same scope.
• opts.extra — optional object embedded in the JWT payload (visible to anyone with the token).
• opts.instrumentation — true for defaults, or an object: { blockAutomatedBrowsers, obfuscationLevel }.
• opts.instrumentationGenerator — escape hatch for offloading script generation to a worker pool.

The token is a signed JWT containing the challenge config. expires is the JWT expiry in ms. instrumentation, if requested, is the deflate+base64 client-side script to be run by the widget.

validateChallenge(secret, body, opts?)

Returns Promise<{ success: true, token, tokenKey, expires, scope, iat } | { success: false, reason, instr_error? }>.

body:

• token — challenge token from generateChallenge
• solutions — number array, length must equal challenge.c
• instr — instrumentation result (if you enabled it)
• instr_blocked, instr_timeout — flags from the widget when instrumentation rejected the page

opts:

• scope — must match the original challenge's scope
• tokenTtlMs — TTL for the redeem token. Default 1_200_000 (20 min).
• consumeNonce(sigHex, ttlMs) — replay prevention via your storage. See below.
• signToken(data) — async fn returning a custom redeem token format. By default returns id:secret.

Failure reasons

reason	meaning
invalid_body	body isn't an object
missing_token	no token provided
missing_solutions	solutions missing or not an array
invalid_token	JWT signature mismatch / malformed / out-of-bounds params
scope_mismatch	token's scope doesn't match opts.scope
expired	challenge JWT expired
invalid_solutions	length mismatch or non-numbers
nonce_store_error	consumeNonce callback threw
already_redeemed	consumeNonce returned false
invalid_solution	solutions don't satisfy the PoW
instr_*	instrumentation failed (with instr_error: true)

Replay prevention

The library is stateless by design. To prevent a captured submission from being redeemed twice, pass a consumeNonce callback. capjs-core calls it with the JWT's signature hex and the remaining TTL; you store that hex in your KV with SET NX EX semantics and return false on repeats.

redis

import { Redis } from "ioredis";
const redis = new Redis(process.env.REDIS_URL);

const consumeNonce = async (sigHex, ttlMs) => {
  const ttlSec = Math.ceil(ttlMs / 1000);
  const ok = await redis.set(`cap:${sigHex}`, "1", "NX", "EX", ttlSec);
  return ok === "OK";
};

cloudflare-kv

const consumeNonce = async (sigHex, ttlMs) => {
  const key = `cap:${sigHex}`;
  if (await env.NONCES.get(key)) return false;
  await env.NONCES.put(key, "1", {
    expirationTtl: Math.ceil(ttlMs / 1000),
  });
  return true;
};

postgres

const consumeNonce = async (sigHex, ttlMs) => {
  const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ttlMs).toISOString();
  try {
    await db`INSERT INTO cap_nonces (sig, expires_at) VALUES (${sigHex}, ${expiresAt})`;
    return true;
  } catch (e) {
    if (e.code === "23505") return false; // unique violation
    throw e;
  }
};

The check runs after PoW and instrumentation verification, so an attacker who replays a captured submission with garbage solutions can't burn the legitimate user's nonce.

Instrumentation

Pass instrumentation: true (or an options object) to generateChallenge to receive a deflate+base64 client script. The widget runs it, sends back a fingerprint, and validateChallenge verifies it.

const ch = await generateChallenge(SECRET, {
  instrumentation: {
    blockAutomatedBrowsers: true, // reject playwright/puppeteer/selenium
    obfuscationLevel: 3, // 1-10, default 3
  },
});

When blockAutomatedBrowsers is on, the script runs realm-escape and behavioral checks that detect headless Chromium, automation framework markers, and JS-sandbox impersonation. See Instrumentation for details.

Higher obfuscation levels are slower to generate. Levels 4–7 add a custom string-table indirection plus esbuild minification. Levels 8–10 layer in javascript-obfuscator (string-array, control-flow flattening, dead-code injection) — these block the event loop for tens of milliseconds per challenge, so use them only for low-volume routes or supply your own instrumentationGenerator that runs in a worker pool.

Stateless deployment patterns

Warning: These scripts don't include built-in replay protection. Make sure to add it yourself.

Cloudflare Workers

import { generateChallenge, validateChallenge } from "capjs-core";

const SECRET = (env) => env.CAP_SECRET;

export default {
  async fetch(req, env) {
    const url = new URL(req.url);

    if (url.pathname === "/challenge" && req.method === "POST") {
      const ch = await generateChallenge(SECRET(env), { instrumentation: true });
      return Response.json(ch);
    }

    if (url.pathname === "/redeem" && req.method === "POST") {
      const body = await req.json();
      const result = await validateChallenge(SECRET(env), body, {
        consumeNonce: async (sigHex, ttlMs) => {
          if (await env.NONCES.get(`cap:${sigHex}`)) return false;
          await env.NONCES.put(`cap:${sigHex}`, "1", {
            expirationTtl: Math.ceil(ttlMs / 1000),
          });
          return true;
        },
      });
      return Response.json(result);
    }

    return new Response("not found", { status: 404 });
  },
};

Bun

import { generateChallenge, validateChallenge } from "capjs-core";
const SECRET = process.env.CAP_SECRET;

Bun.serve({
  port: 3000,
  routes: {
    "/challenge": {
      POST: () => Response.json(generateChallenge(SECRET, { instrumentation: true })),
    },
    "/redeem": {
      POST: async (req) => {
        const body = await req.json();
        return Response.json(await validateChallenge(SECRET, body));
      },
    },
  },
});

RSW challenges

Since v0.1.1 and widget v0.1.51, both pieces understand a richer wire format that supports multiple challenge protocols in a single response: SHA-256 PoW (the default), the new RSW time-lock puzzle, and instrumentation.

Minimum opt-in

import { generateChallenge, generateRswKeypair, validateChallenge } from "capjs-core";

const SECRET = process.env.CAP_SECRET;
const KEYPAIR = generateRswKeypair(2048); // once at boot, persist this!

app.post("/api/challenge", async () => {
  return await generateChallenge(SECRET, {
    format: 2,
    protocols: ["rsw", "instrumentation"],
    keypair: KEYPAIR,
    t: 75_000, // optional. we recommend keeping it at 75_000
  });
});

app.post("/api/redeem", async (req) => {
  return await validateChallenge(SECRET, req.body, { consumeNonce });
});